ABSTRACT. Collusion in auctions affects both revenue and efficiency and are prevalent. Yet, sellers do not use collusion-proof auctions as often as they should. Why is that? We find that one reason for this could be the cost of implementing efficient collusion-proof auctions. We use California highway procurements data, to estimate the cost of implementing collusion-proof auction. Our estimates show that cost must increase by at least 10.8% to ensure efficient outcome. The cost can sometimes be as high as 48.8% (depending on the size of bidding-ring in the data).
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, auctions have become synonymous with buying and selling. Timber sales, financial assets, highway procurement and online advertisements, all use auction. A contract with many agents may be susceptible to collusion, which is quite prevalent. See Comanor and Schankerman [1976] ; Feinstein, Block, and Nold [1985] ; Lang and Rosenthal [1991] ; Porter and Zona [1993] ; Bajari [2001] ; Porter and Zona [1999] ; Pesendorfer [2000] ; Asker [2008] ; Harrington [2008] ; Taibbi [2012 Taibbi [ , 2013 among others.
1 Collusion lowers revenue and leads to inefficient outcome Ausubel and Milgrom [2006] . Yet most auctions that we see in the data are standard auctions, auctions that are vulnerable to collusion. Why aren't auctions that are efficient and less vulnerable to collusion more common, given that collusion has first-order effect on auction outcome?
The answer to this question cannot just be that such collusion-proof auctions are more difficult to run. It cannot also be that the seller can stop collusion by barring those who collude because detecting collusion is difficult, see Bajari and Ye [2003] ; Aryal and Gabrielli [2013] . 2 Cartels often go to a greater length to keep its existence secret and anonymous, see Asker [2008] and references therein. Even when we know their identity, it might be difficult to prove any wrong doing. For instance in the Libor scandal, the banks implicated in a law suit have asked a federal court in New York to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that the plaintiffs have failed to prove collusive behavior, see Hou and Skeie [2013] ; Taibbi [2013] for more.
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The thesis of this paper is that implementing auctions that are robust with respect to collusion is too costly. To reach that conclusion we first estimate the distribution of bidders' cost from the California highway procurement data, then simulate the cost of running an auction proposed by Chen and Micali [2012] (henceforth, CM) that is resilient to collusion and always guarantees efficient allocation. The increase in cost is the price of achieving efficient allocation. We chose CM-auction because it is simple and like Vickery (see below) is dominant strategy solvable and hence is a "detail-free" auction. We find that procurement cost could increase by no less than 10.8%, and sometimes even as high as 48.8%! The cost depends on the size and number of bidding rings, something that is unknown to the researcher and hence must be determined from the data.
To understand why efficiency might be so costly when bidders collude it is important to understand the auction rules. Unlike the standard auction, in CM-auction bidders report a bid and their affiliation to any bidding ring. 4 Once the bidding rings are determined, the auction rule is similar to Vickery auction: the lowest bidder wins the auction but gets a price that is equal to the lowest bid from outside the winner's ring. Since the price received by a ring is not a function of the bids by ring members, truthful bidding is an 2 Aryal and Gabrielli [2013] implemented their tests and found no evidence of collusion even though they focused only on bidders who failed Bajari and Ye [2003] 's tests. 3 The size of Libor market is large, estimated to be anywhere from $350 to $800 trillion. 4 Truthful reporting of one's affiliation is achieved by off-the-equilibrium punishment phase where bidders pay a fine if their affiliation reports are inconsistent, for example when any two bidders are inconsistent about their ring-identity. equilibrium. For more on coalition strategy-proofness see Green and Laffont [1979] . Just like Vickery auction, CM-auction is efficient, but it comes at a price -the incentive for the bidder to report their group affiliation.
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To run CM-auction we need the distribution of bidders cost and the identity of ring members. We estimate the distribution by following Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong [2000] . To identify the ring members, we divide bidders into two types: regular bidders (type 1) and fringe bidders (type 2), Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer [2003] . Regular bidders are the ones who bid in expensive contracts, valued at $1 million or more and are the only types who can collude. Then we follow Bajari and Ye [2003] to determine bid that are not consistent with competitive bidding. Of the twenty-five type 1 bidders, we focus on only fifteen bidders. If all these bidders form one ring, the worst case for the seller, the CM-auction increases the cost of procurement by 48.8%.
If some bids are inconsistent with competitive bidding Bajari and Ye [2003] , then it will affect the distribution of the cost. To correct that we follow Aryal and Gabrielli [2013] . We assume that the coalition is rational, so all bidders maximize the sum of total payoff. Then we only use the lowest bid from coalition members to estimate the bid distribution. Remaining bids are "cover bids," and hence need not be depend on bidders cost. When we also exploit the frequency of simultaneous bids amongst these fifteen bidders, we find that only four of them fail the test. Then when we consider a coalition of only four bidders, the price of implementing CM-auction drops to 10.8%. Since the steps to determine ring members is never full proof, we remain agnostic and say that the cost of procurement could increase by anywhere from 10.8% to 48.8%, but the steps outlined in this paper can be used in any other data.
To estimate the bid distribution, instead of the widely used kernel-smoothed density estimators that are inconsistent at the endpoints of the support, we use the local polynomial estimation (henceforth, LPE) method, see Fan and Gijbels [1996] . Using LPE automatically takes care of this boundary issue without trimming the data.
6
This paper is organized as follows: Section (2) outlines the models, identification and estimation; Section (3) proposes the collusion-proof mechanism; Section (4) explains the data and the ways to determine the colluding bidders; Section (5) presents the empirical findings; Section (6) concludes.
Choice of bandwidths, tables and figure are collected in the Appendix.
MODEL, IDENTIFICATION AND ESTIMATION
In this section we consider a procurement auction, i.e. a low-price sealed bid auction with asymmetric bidders: regular and fringe bidders. The section is divided into two subsections. The first subsection considers the model with and without collusion and covers nonparametric identification.
The second subsection deals with estimation.
2.1. Model and Identification. For every auction = 1, 2, . . . , L, a single and indivisible project is procured to N ≥ 2 risk neutral bidders using first price sealed bids mechanism. The essential characteristic of the project for each auction is summarized by a random variable X ∈ R ++ , which for us will be the engineer's estimate of the project. We assume that there are two types (k = 0, 1) of bidders with n k type k bidders, for auction , such that N = n 0 + n 1 .
7 In every auction a type k bidder draws his cost, i.i.d.
across all other bidders, from F k (·|X , N ). Further, we assume that the costs are independent across auctions. Now, we consider two cases: competition and collusion.
2.1.1. Competition. The set of observables W is
where b ki is the bid by type k ∈ {0, 1} bidder i ∈ n k . Then we make the following assumptions:
As far as we know, the only other paper to use LPE in empirical auction is Gabrielli and Vuong [2010] , who use it to propose a √ n− consistent semiparametric estimation method. 7 We abuse the notation to use n k as both the number and set of type k bidders.
(1) Exogenous Participation:
(2) For each and each k ∈ {0, 1} the variables C ki , i ∈ n k ∼ iid F k (·|·) with density f k (·|·) conditional on X . (3) An auction has N ∈ {n, n} risk-neutral bidders with n ≥ 2. (4) The three-dimensional vector (X , n 0 , n 1 ) ∼ iid Q m (·, ·, ·) with density q m (·, ·, ·) for all = 1, 2, . . . L.
A strategy for bidder i of type k is a strictly increasing, type symmetric bidding strategy
is the probability that bidder j ∈ n k \{i} will bid less than b, and likewise for k .
9 The first order condition for i ∈ n k is
This first order condition with the boundary conditions s k (c) = c, k = 0, 1 uniquely characterizes optimal bidding strategy for all bidders. The model structure is the type specific conditional distribution of cost {F k (·|X )} for k = 0, 1 given X. But since the data provide information on the characteristics of the project that is being procured, X in the th project, we can consider only the type specific conditional cost distribution F k (·|X ), k = 0, 1 as the structural parameter. The question of identification is to ask if there are two pairs of cost distributions {F 0 (·|X ), F 1 (·|X )} and {F 0 (·|X ), F 1 (·|X )} 8 We abuse the notation to use n k to represent both the random variable and its realization and Q(·) is a product of absolutely continuous measure and a counting measure. 9 The second equality follows from Assumption (A1.1)-exogenous participation. This mapping between bids and valuation distribution under equilibrium condition is due to Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong [2000] .
that are observationally equivalent. Evaluating (1) at the estimated bid distribution and densities, we see that for each auction , bid b ki uniquely determines the cost
thereby identifying {F 0 (·|X ), F 1 (·|X )} that is consistent with the data.
2.1.2. Collusion. Now, we also consider a model where some of the type 1 bidders collude. We maintain all the afore mentioned assumptions. For every auction , let M ⊂ n 1 be the set of bidders who collude. We focus on efficient collusion where the colluders have access to a centralized mechanism that can control the bids placed by the members in the real auction. So there will be only one serious bid in each auction from the bidders in M and the rest will be just cover-bids. We also assume that the bidders outside the ring are unaware about the ring. This means that when we map the observed bids to the underlying cost we consider only the minimum bid b * 1 among the bidders in M and the bids by everyone outside M to estimate the type 1 bid distribution and density G * 1 (·|·, ·) and g * 1 (·|·, ·). Then, we can use these estimates instead of G 1 and g 1 in (2) to recover the pseudo cost for each non-members. But for the the minimum bid we usê
where the main difference from the non-colluders is that while the noncolluders think they are competing with n 1 type-1 bidders and n 0 type 0 bidders, the ring knows that it is competing with only n 1 − (|M | − 1) bidders. For type 0 bidders, just like with the type 1 non-colluders, the only difference is that the appropriate type 1 bid distribution and density are, respectively, G * 1 (·|·, ·) and g * 1 (·|·, ·).
Estimation.
In the first step we estimate the conditional bid distributions G k (·|X, N) and the bid densities g k (·|X, N) given the engineer's estimate X and the set of bidders N, using Local Polynomial Estimation (LPE) method, see Fan and Gijbels [1996] ; Gabrielli and Vuong [2010] .
. Our interest is the regression function m(x 0 ) and its derivatives m (x 0 ), m (x 0 ) and so on till m p (x 0 ). Hence, we regard the model E[Y|X] = m(X). Under the assumption that (p + 1) th derivative of m(·) at x = x 0 exists, LPE can approximate m(·) by a polynomial of order p. Taylor expansion gives
and this polynomial is fitted locally by a weighted least squares regression that minimizes
where h is the bandwidth,
. . , p is the solution to the weighted least squares then it is clear that j!β j (x 0 ) is the estimator for m j (x 0 ), j = 0, . . . , p. For us, Y will be the indicator function and hence β 0 (·) will be the LPE estimator of the conditional bids distribution and its first derivative β 1 (·) will be the corresponding density. The exact form used for our estimation is given in Appendix (A-1). We make the following assumptions for estimation.
Assumption A3:
(i) The kernels K G (·), K 0g (·) and K 1g (·) are symmetric with bounded hypercube supports and twice continuous bounded derivatives with respect to their arguments,
Thus moments of order strictly smaller than R − 1 vanish.
Assumption A4:
The bandwidths h G , h 1g and h 2g satisfy
From this assumption it is clear that it is possible to choose the optimal bandwidths, i.e. the bandwidths proposed in Stone [1982] . Unlike GPV we do not need to specify a "boundary bandwidth" since the local polynomial method does not require knowledge of the location of the endpoints of the support. Therefore, it is not necessary to estimate the boundary of the support of the bid distribution. This is necessary when one needs to trim out observations, which we do not given that our estimator is not subject to the so-called boundary effect. We have 3 conditioning variables, one that is continuous and two that are discrete. Thus, we have to adapt the definition of the LPE to the present case. However, the discrete variables do not affect the asymptotic properties of the estimator, so in order to choose the optimal bandwidth the relevant number of covariates to consider is the number of continuous variables.
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We will denote by p the number of continuous variables and by d the total number of conditioning variables. For our application, d = 3 and p = 1. Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong [2000] we know that G k (·|·) is R + 1 times continuously differentiable on its entire support and therefore g k (·|·) is R times continuously differentiable on its entire support as well. 11 Given the smoothness of each function we propose to use a LPE (R), i.e. a LPE of degree R, for G k (·|·, ·, ·) and a LPE (R − 1) for g k (·|·, ·, ·). Following Fan, Gasser, Gijbels, Brockmann, and Engel [1993] we can show that the bid distribution is consistent and following Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong [2000] it is easy to see that the estimated costs are strongly consistent. The exact econometrics model and the selection of optimal bandwidth are explained in Appendix A-1.
COLLUSION PROOF MECHANISM
We begin with an example, adopted from Chen and Micali [2012] and for more formal and through treatment we direct the readers to that paper.
10 Similar observation is made by Abadie and Imbens [2006] . 11 From Proposition 1 by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong [2000] , we also know that the conditional density g 0 (·|·, ·) is R + 1 times continuously differentiable on a closed subset of the interior of the support and thus the degree of smoothness closed to the boundaries and at the boundaries of the support is not R + 1.
Example 1. Consider 4 risk neutral bidders with cost (1, 1, 100, 100) and the first and second bidders collude together. Furthermore, suppose that they have a wrong belief about the types of the other two bidders. In particular they believe that their respective costs are (0.1, 2). Under competitive second price auction one of the two bidders will sell the object at 100. Under collusion they could adopt the following strategy: 1 bids 1 and 2 bids 100. The real bids will then be (1, 100, 100, 100) and hence the coalition gets a surplus of 99 which can be shared easily between the two. Now, suppose bidders report their bids (the price at which they are willing to supply the public good) and their coalition membership, if any. The winner is the bidder who announces the lowest price and the price is equal to the second highest price outside of the winner's coalition, i.e. the price paid by a coalition is not controlled by them. To see this, consider the following announcement (1, {1, 2}), (1, {1, 2}), (100, {3}) and (100, {4}). This ensures strategy proof-ness and the object is sold to coalition for 100.
The example shows that the mechanism is a slight variation of classic second price auction, now with respect to coalitions rather than a singleton.
Let there be N < ∞ risk-neutral bidders in an independent private value, low bid auction. Each bidder draws i.i.d cost C ∼ F(·). 12 Let C represent the partition of players such that each element of the partition represents a coalition such that every singleton {i} ∈ C is an independent bidder, and M is a generic element. The set was {{1, 2}, {3}} in the example. Let M = {N, F(·), C} be the context of the game and is commonly known by all the bidders. Moreover, we assume that for every coalition M ∈ C, the |M|− tuple cost profile C M = {C i : i ∈ M} is common knowledge only amongst the bidders in that coalition. The seller, however, only knows {N, F(·)}.
be an allocation and pricing rule, where A i ∈ {0, 1} such that i∈N A i = 1 and P i is the price paid by the bidder i. We assume that all coalitions are efficient and hence when the ex-post utility of a bidder i is (P i − C i )A i , the utility of the coalition M is the sum across the members, i.e. u M = i∈M (P i − C i )A i . Each member i ∈ M acts to maximize u M (·). So, a bidder with cost C reports his cost and the coalition M. Let u M (s) denote the total utility of coalition M when everyone uses symmetric bidding strategy s(·). Now, we are in a position to define dominant-strategy truthfulness and coalitional rationality.
Definition 2. An auction is collusively dominant-strategy truthful if, for all coalition M ∈ C and all strategy profiles s M := {s i (·) : i ∈ M} and s −M := {s j (·) :
In other words, we say that (i, j) is disagreement if i claims to be a part of collusion ring M i that contains j but j does not reciprocate. Given a profile s(·) the outcome (A, P) is computed as follows: First, there is the punishing phase if there is any disagreement, in which case A i = 0 for all i. Then to determine the price we start with P i = 0 and for each disagreement (i, j) charge P i = P i + 2t and P j = P j − t, while keeping t with the seller.
13 Second, when there is no disagreement we initiate the standard phase where from the reported coalitions the coalition partition C is constructed. Then, the lowest bidder wins the auction and we determine the winning coalition M * and charge
o/w to every bidder i, where C 1:(N\M * ) is the lowest bid from the bidder j ∈ M. After each letting, the information about all bids and their ranking is made public.
We divide bidders into two broad types of asymmetric bidders: the fringe bidders (type 0) who bid in small projects and are infrequent and the main bidders (type 1) who participate frequently and in bigger projects. The private cost is interpreted as a reduced form of the real cost of production and depends on many unobservable characteristics of the bidder. The data consist of 2,152 projects awarded by Caltrans for a total of $7,645 millions but we focus only on 1,907 projects that had at least two bidders. Of all bidders, only 823 bidders bid at least once. In the remaining subsection we determine the set of bidders who fail the tests proposed by [Bajari and Ye, 2003 ]:
14 The data is publicly available at http://www.dot.ca.gov/hq/esc/oe/awards/ bidsum/. 15 Some examples of projects include asphalt repaving, road paving, bridge reconstruction, striping the highway, constructing, replacing and widening brides, storm damage repair, etcetera. the colluders. We find that the fifteen type 1 bidders, who bid simultaneously more often on a pairwise basis, fail at least one of the conditions by [Bajari and Ye, 2003 ] for competitive bidding. Since we do not know the true collusive ring, we further explore some other features in the data in a hope to narrow the set of members in the ring. Looking at the frequency of their bids and their winning patterns we narrow the coalition to only four bidders. The exact process is explained in the reaming of this section.
The main difficulty with this exercise is to determine the set of colluders, so the way we determine these two sets should be taken as suggestive and exploratory. it with the actual number of wins: bidders with consistently higher actual win than the expected win will be termed as those who have higher market power. Expected number of wins is defined as follows: consider A, who bids on a total of 50 projects against a varying number of bidders, n for = 1, . . . , 50. Then his expected win is defined to be 50 =1 1/n . By comparing third and fourth column, we see that with the exception of five bidders, all bidders win more contracts than expected. The fifth column reports the average bid of each bidder and the sixth column reports the revenue sharethe total value of the bidder's winning bid as a fraction of the total value of 16 The main point is, we can either use the tests from the literature and be agnostic about the nature of the collusive ring or try and explore some other features besides the test to determine the ring, in a hope that the exploration helps us find the "true" collusive rings.
winning bids for all contracts. The last column is the participation rate (i.e. the bid frequency rate), and bidder D is the one that stands out at 44%. (i) on an average there are slightly more than four bidders; (ii) average winning bid is $3.33 million, which is less than the average engineers' estimate of $3.77 million while the average bid is $3.79 million; (iii) money on the table -the difference between the highest and the second highest bid -is on average $300,000 suggesting informational asymmetry among bidders. We also find that distance between the bidder's office and the site of project has no bearing on the bids. In general higher valued projects (between $1 million and $20 millions) attract relatively fewer bidders, suggesting that it is the main bidders who can gain the most by colluding and moreover, larger projects are more profitable, all else equal. Now, we follow the tests proposed by [Bajari and Ye, 2003 ] on this subsample of bids for twenty five type 1 bidders. The basic idea behind the tests is to detect those bidders whose bidding pattern systemically violate competitive and independent bidding. To increase the likelihood of picking a coalition we give more emphasis to bidders who participate in the same auction because as the theoretical literature suggests ring members tend to participate in the same auctions to enforce the bidding agreement.
To this end, we consider all combinations of pairs and select those bidders that have at least fifteen simultaneous bids, see Table A -3. There are fifteen bidders who bid frequently together. 17 First, to test independence we consider the fifteen pairs of bidders bidding frequently described above and estimate the following models for fifteen type 1 bidders and the remaining bidders, respectively
Here LDIST i is the logarithm of distance, LMDIST i is the logarithm of the minimum of distances of all bidders (except i) to the project and UTIL i is the utilization rate of the capacity. We define the utilization rate as Util it = 17 This cutoff is based on the data and is big enough to capture the simultaneous bidding but not too big so that we have enough observations left for the test.
Backlog it /Capacity i , where backlog is defined as the past projects that were won but yet to be completed and the capacity is the total capacity of bidder.
We find that approximately 60% of bids are explained by capacity, although the effect varies across bidders; for more on the effect of capacity utilization on bidding behavior see [Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer, 2003 ]. For the bidders listed in Table A -3 (those who participate frequently) we estimate (4) with bidder-varying coefficients and for the rest we use (5).
For every pair i, j, from the fifteen type 1 bidders, let ρ ij = corr(û i ,û j ), be the correlation between estimated residuals. We use the Pearson's correlation test for independence and find that for all but one pair, bidder D and W, we reject the null hypothesis of independence at 5% level; see Table A -4. Second, we test exchangeability Therefore we reject the null of exchangeability when comparing the fifteen bidders (potential cartel members) against the remaining bidders. The assumption thus far is that all fifteen bidders form one single coalition and in our counterfactual exercise of case 1, when we say potential colluders we mean these fifteen bidders.
However, sustaining such a large coalition might be difficult. To see if we can reduce the size of the coalition, we conduct pairwise tests by pooling bidders accordingly and find that the hypothesis of exchangeability is rejected at conventional levels for 13 out of 15 pairs including the pair (D,P), (A,D) and (D,E). See Table A-5 for details. Comparing the "expected win" with the actual win for these pairs, we do see that at least one member of the pair wins often. Comparing Table A-1 and Table A 
ESTIMATION RESULTS
In this section we present the main findings from estimation of the pseudocost and from the counterfactual exercise of implementing CM-auction. As we mentioned in the sections (2) and (4.1), we have two sets of type specific costs and also two sets of colluders. The first case uses all the bids data to recover cost and finds that fifteen out of twenty-five regular bidders could be colluding according to Bajari and Ye [2003] . The second case takes into account the fact that some bidders might already be colluding. To determine the set of colluders we use the same tests as above and some other data features, which allows us to identify a set of four bidders. In every auction we discard all but the minimum bid by these four colluders to estimate the cost.
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Let M be the set of colluders who are present in auction and let i ∈ N be the winner andb the corresponding bid. Let o be the smallest cost amongst all bidders participating in auction who do belong to the coalition M . That is if the winner belongs to the coalition, i.e. i ∈ M , then o = 18 Ideally we would have liked to conduct the tests for every subsets of these fifteen bidders not just the pairs, but the amount of data for each case is insufficient making the tests unreliable.
19 As mentioned earlier we assume that the coalition is rational and maximizes the total payoff. This means only the bid corresponding to the lowest cost will be serious, the rest will only be "cover-bids." min j∈n \M Ĉ j and if the winner is not a member of the coalition then we can set o =b , the real winning bid. Then the difference between CMauction and the data is r = o −b if the winner is a cartel member and r = 0 otherwise. Once we compute the change in cost r for all auctions the total change in cost of procuring is just r . For the first case the total set of colluders is the fifteen bidders (see section 4.1) and M = M ∩ n 1 .
Likewise for the second case we find that only M = {A, B, D, E} bidders are consistent with collusion and hence M = n 1 ∩ {A, B, D, E}. Figure 1 shows the empirical CDF of r for these two cases.
We find that, in the first case with large coalition, implementing CMauction increases the total cost by 48.8%, while for the second case the cost increases by 10.8%. This difference in cost is not surprising given the difference in size of the two rings.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we ask why do not sellers choose auction formats that are resilient to collusion? We find that one important reason could be that it could be too expensive to choose such an auction. In particular, we use estimates from California highway procurement data on CM-auction. CM-auction have many advantages: it is not based on any equilibrium notion and uses dominant strategy truthfulness; it is easy to implement and requires minimal common knowledge assumption; and it is also robust with respect to the transfer among ring members.
We find that the procurement cost could increase by anywhere between 10.8%, to 48.8%. The cost could be this high because the auction is always efficient, so one way to reduce the cost could be relax this demand. But to know the exact cost, one needs to estimate the entire revenue-efficiency frontier.
Finally, we acknowledge that the exogenous entry assumption could be a strong assumption. Even though we know much more about how to estimate auctions with costly and selective entry, Gentry and Li [2014] , as far as we know, nothing is known about auctions that are both collusive dominant strategy truthful and that allow bidders to collude prior to their participation decisions, which is an important area of research.
APPENDIX
A-1. ESTIMATION
In this section we outline the estimation problem and discuss the choice of bandwidths and kernels. To account for the skewness in the bid distribution, a widely observed problem encountered with auction data, we use logarithmic transformation. For notational simplicity we suppress the dependance of the distributions on (X, N), unless otherwise noted. Log transformation of (2) gives 
Let (x, n 0 , n 1 ) be a point in R 3 . The estimators involved are, as mentioned above Local Polynomial Estimators. For our application, R = 2 and therefore we implement a LPE(2) for each cdf involved and a LPE (1) for each pdf involved. Let Y G p = 1I(B pl ≤ b). Using a local quadratic approximation to estimate each cdf implies obtaining the solution to the following least squares minimization problem
with respect to β G = (β 0 , β 1 , β 2 , β 3 , β 11 , β 12 , β 13 , β 23 , β 22 , β 33 ). In particular we are interested in β 0 = G(b|x, n 0 , n 1 ); see Fan and Gijbels [1996] . Then, we know from the least squares theory thatβ 
. We use a local linear estimator, i.e. LPE(1) which, as before, is obtained as the solution to the following least squares problem
It is well known thatβ g = (Z T T g Z) −1 Z T T g Y. The design matrix Z for the local linear case is
The corresponding weighting matrix for each estimation procedure are
The bandwidths and kernels involved for distributions and densities are different.
A-1.1. Choices of Kernels and Bandwidths. Since the exact choice of the Kernels is not crucial for inference, we use product of univariate kernels to represent the multivariate kernel, i.e.
Here, K m (·, ·, ·) is the multivariate Kernel, K a (·) and K b (·) denote the univariate Kernels corresponding to the continuous variables A and B, respectively, and K n (·) is the kernel for the discrete variables such that K n (·) :=
The kernels for continuous variables should be symmetric with bounded supports, so we decided to use the Epanechnikov Kernel function K(u) = 3/4(1 − u 2 )1I(|u| ≤ 1), as it is an optimal Kernel in the sense that it minimizes the asymptotic mean squared error over all nonnegative functions Fan, Gasser, Gijbels, Brockmann, and Engel [1993] . For the discrete variables, we use Gaussian Kernel because, as there is less variation in the number of bidders it is desirable to give less weight to observations farther from the point at which estimation takes place and is best achieved with a kernel with unbounded support. 20 We assume the smoothness parameter R = 2 for the cost distribution. To ensure uniform consistency at the optimal rates, the bandwidths for the continuous variables are
The constant term comes from the so-called rule of thumb and the factor 2.978 is the one corresponding to the use of Epanechnikov Kernels instead of Gaussian Kernels; see [Hardle, 1991] . 20 There are no theoretical restrictions to the kernels applied to discrete variables. , o/w, (h) Then we have {{c 0i
A-2. TABLES AND FIGURES
, {c * 1 }; = 1, 2, . . . , L} pseudocost vectors.
